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KEEPING MUD OFF THE BENCH:
THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND REGULATION
OF CANDIDATES’ FALSE OR MISLEADING
STATEMENTS IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
ADAM R. LONG
INTRODUCTION
In the last fifty years, perhaps no facet of American constitutional democracy has changed more than campaigns for judicial office. Judicial elections long stood in sharp contrast to elections for executive, legislative, or administrative office. In keeping with the
judicial role of impartial adjudicator, judicial candidates historically
avoided political controversy and campaigned on “polite promises of
1
integrity.” During the late twentieth century, judicial elections were
transformed from their more humble, less contentious beginnings into
elections virtually indistinguishable, in both financial scope and campaign conduct, from other political campaigns.
Campaign donations and expenditures in judicial elections have
risen at exponential rates across the country. In the Los Angeles area,
campaign expenditures in the average superior court race increased
2
twenty-two fold from 1976 to 1994. In 1980, a campaign for an Ohio
3
Supreme Court seat cost $100,000; in 2000, a campaign for a seat on
the same court cost an estimated $9 million.4 In Michigan, the cam-
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paigns for three Supreme Court seats in the 2000 election cost at least
$16 million each.5
These rising costs fuel concerns that campaign contributors are
seeking the best justice that money can buy. One national publication
has noted that “an influx of money from the tobacco industry, casinos, insurance companies, doctors and businesses” finances many ju6
dicial campaigns. In her 2000 reelection bid, incumbent Justice Alice
Robie Resnick of the Ohio Supreme Court received eighty-four percent of her total campaign contributions, totaling $329,175, from Ohio
trial lawyers.7 The other three candidates in the race for Resnick’s
Supreme Court seat received only $55,000 combined from Ohio trial
8
lawyers. In the late 1980s, Texaco representatives made campaign
contributions of $72,700 to seven Texas Supreme Court justices while
the appeal from the $11 billion Pennzoil lawsuit against Texaco was
9
pending before the court. Pennzoil’s lawyers responded by contributing more than $315,000 to justices on that same court.10 Most striking of all, a number of the justices who received campaign contributions from both Texaco and Pennzoil were not even facing
reelection.11
Not only have recent years witnessed an explosion of campaign
expenditures and vast individual donations by parties hoping to influence judicial decisionmaking, but also the conduct of judicial candidates and supporters during campaigns has changed since the days of
“polite promises of integrity.” The influx of money has fueled an increase in political attack advertisements, which utilize the skills of
political consultants to craft slickly packaged, memorable images of
both candidates and opponents. In a 1984 race for the Louisiana Supreme Court, Justice John Dixon’s opponent ran the following newspaper advertisement, accompanied by a drawing of a large dagger:
JOHN DIXON DOESN’T THINK 20 STAB WOUNDS ARE
ENOUGH . . . . On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, six Jus-

5. Glaberson, supra note 4, at A1.
6. Kaplan & Davidson, supra note 2, at 11; see also Shelia Kaplan & Zoë Davidson, Dicey
Justice, NATION, Jan. 26, 1998, at 15, 15 (reporting that, in 1996 and 1997, the casino industry in
Nevada “poured more than $300,000 into the state’s judicial races”).
7. Personal Injury Lawyers Bankroll Resnick’s Re-election, PR NEWSWIRE, June 29, 2000.
8. Id.
9. James J. Alfini & Terrence J. Brooks, Ethical Constraints on Judicial Election Campaigns: A Review and Critique of Canon 7, 77 KY. L.J. 671, 671 (1989).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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tices agreed with the death sentence. ONLY JOHN DIXON
DIDN’T . . . . HE DIDN’T THINK MORE THAN 20 TIMES WAS
ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY THE DEATH PENALTY. WHAT
ABOUT YOU? THERE COMES A TIME TO DRAW THE
12
LINE. THE TIME IS NOW.

During the 2000 campaign, Citizens for a Strong Ohio, a pro-business
organization, accused Justice Alice Robie Resnick of the Ohio Supreme Court “of having an anti-business bias, encouraged by the do13
nations of trial lawyers.” In one television advertisement that Citizens for a Strong Ohio sponsored, Justice Resnick was depicted “in
black robes switching a vote after someone dumped bags of money on
her desk. Another show[ed] a blindfolded lady justice peeking at a
pile of money on her scales, before she and the scales fall over and
break.”14 Justice Resnick was not defenseless in her reelection campaign, however; Ohio unions, trial lawyers, and teachers’ organizations each ran advertisements attacking her opponent, Judge Terrance O’Donnell. One pro-Resnick advertisement told voters that
Judge O’Donnell “once ruled in favor of the employer in the case of a
factory worker dismembered and killed by an unsafe machine.”15
The explosion of campaign expenditures and the proliferation of
attack advertisements demonstrate the dilemma facing the thirty-nine
16
states that currently elect judges. States that elect judges grapple
with “the conflict between the needs to preserve judicial neutrality
and to maintain public respect for the legal system, and the political
realities of election campaigns.”17 That is, how should a judicial candidate campaign during a popular election? In the context of judicial
elections, a state’s interests in preserving judicial integrity and impar-

12. Max Minzner, Gagged but Not Bound: The Ineffectiveness of the Rules Governing Judicial Campaign Speech, 68 UMKC L. REV. 209, 209 (1999).
13. David Ruppe, Soft Money’s Spread: Business Buys a Voice During Ohio Supreme Court
Race, ABCNEWS.com, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/DailyNews/ohiosoftmoney_
001103.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2000) (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
14. Id.
15. Spencer Hunt, Chief Justice: Appoint Judges; Moyer Distressed by Negative Ads,
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 10, 2000, at C1.
16. See, e.g., PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 9 (1990) (observing that “[o]nly eleven states and the District
of Columbia have eschewed public elections entirely in their selection of appellate court judges
and trial judges of general jurisdiction”); Glaberson, supra note 4, at A1 (stating that, in thirtynine states, “at least some judges face elections to get or keep their offices”).
17. Elizabeth I. Kiovsky, Comment, First Amendment Rights of Attorneys and Judges in
Election Campaigns, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 201, 201 (1986).
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tiality and in a potential litigant’s right to a fair and impartial judiciary
can conflict with a candidate’s right to free speech. These potentially
conflicting interests and rights demonstrate the need for “compromises between political reality and the aim of maintaining the appearance of judicial impartiality.”18
In both the role it performs and the public image it seeks to
maintain, the judiciary differs from the executive and legislative
branches. Judges must administer the law objectively and independently, “serv[ing] as impartial arbiters beholden only to their duty to
19
dispense justice.” Popularly elected officeholders cannot serve on a
purely impartial and independent basis and hope to remain in office.
Because they are elected, executive officers and legislators must at all
times consider their constituencies’ views when performing the duties
of office.20 An elected judiciary, however, must maintain not only judicial impartiality and independence, but also a level of public trust
and confidence higher than that reserved for other political branches.
If the citizenry sees judges as politicians first, concerned with reelection and the appeasement of campaign contributors in every decision
they make, the public will question the validity and legitimacy of judicial decisions and, in fact, the judiciary as a whole. If the judiciary
must both function differently and be perceived differently than the
executive and legislative branches, then judicial candidates must
campaign differently than executive and legislative candidates.
The campaign finance issue in judicial elections clearly poses a
significant threat to the real and perceived integrity and impartiality
21
of the judiciary. The public belief that judicial elections produce
“[t]he best justice(s) money can buy”22 does not inspire trust and confidence in elected judiciaries, and many commentators have discussed
the causes of, and possible solutions to, the influx of big money into

18. E. WAYNE THODE, REPORTER’S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 96 (1973).
19. Neil K. Sethi, Comment, The Elusive Middle Ground: A Proposed Constitutional
Speech Restriction for Judicial Selection, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 714 (1997) (citing SARA
MATHIAS, ELECTING JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 6 (1990)).
20. Id.
21. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Some Realism About Electoralism: Rethinking Judicial
Campaign Finance, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 505 (1999) (discussing the increasing problems associated with campaign finance in judicial elections); Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and
Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (Summer
1998) (same); Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133 (1998) (same).
22. Alfini & Brooks, supra note 9, at 671.
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once-modest state judicial campaigns.23 Although campaign finance
poses a great threat to judicial impartiality and independence, judicial
candidates’ conduct further weakens the perceived integrity of judicial institutions. Attack advertisements and campaign misrepresentations erase what line remains between politician and judge, and such
conduct has only recently received attention from public officials,
academics, and the media.24 The citizenry cannot conceivably maintain faith in the judiciary’s impartiality and integrity if it witnesses the
slick, misleading advertisements and public mudslinging that candidates use to reach the bench every election year.
The growth of campaign expenditures and the use of thirtysecond television and radio advertisements have forced states to restrict candidates’ knowing misrepresentations in campaign communications to preserve the perceived integrity of the judiciary. If judicial
candidates knowingly misrepresent their opponents’ records and positions in a culture that pays little attention to the substance of judicial
campaigns, “[t]he dignity [of the judiciary] . . . will go the way the confidence of the American public has gone with other branches of gov25
ernment populated by politicians.” Punishing judicial candidates for
their knowing misrepresentations is one way to distinguish judicial
candidates from other politicians, thereby preserving public faith in
the judiciary.
For example, on July 21, 2000, the Alabama Judiciary Inquiry
Commission (JIC) began disciplinary proceedings against Alabama
Supreme Court Justice Harold F. See, Jr., for statements Justice See’s
campaign disseminated during the 2000 primary election for chief jus26
tice of the Alabama Supreme Court. During the primary campaign
against Judge Roy S. Moore, Justice See’s campaign ran advertisements that questioned Judge Moore’s record, especially his leniency
towards drug dealers.27 The JIC claimed that Justice See violated

23. See supra note 21.
24. See, e.g., Glaberson, supra note 4, at A1 (describing the efforts made by “legislators,
governors, courts, [and] citizens’ groups” to address the “excesses of judicial politicking” in the
wake of the 2000 election).
25. Jennifer L. Brunner, Comment, Separation of Power as a Basis for Restraint on a Free
Speaking Judiciary and the Implementation of Canon 7 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in Ohio
as a Model for Other States, 1999 DET. C. L. REV. 729, 748.
26. Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1227 (M.D. Ala. 2000)
[hereinafter Butler I]. Justice See lost in the primary election for chief justice and remained an
associate justice of the Alabama Supreme Court after the election. Id. at 1226.
27. Id. at 1227; Glaberson, supra note 1, at A1.
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Canon 7B(2) of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics, which stated
in relevant part:
[A] candidate shall not . . . distribute false information concerning a
judicial candidate or an opponent, either knowing the information to
be false or with reckless disregard of whether that information is
false; or . . . distribute true information about a judicial candidate or
an opponent that would be deceiving or misleading to a reasonable
28
person.

After the disciplinary proceeding against him began, Justice See and
others brought suit in the federal district court for the Middle District
of Alabama, seeking an injunction against the JIC on the ground that
Alabama’s Canon 7B(2) violated First Amendment rights of free
29
speech. The district court granted Justice See’s motion and enjoined
enforcement of Canon 7B(2) on the ground that the canon “is not
narrowly drafted and . . . unnecessarily infringes upon . . . First
Amendment rights.”30 The district court in Butler v. Alabama Judicial
31
Inquiry Commission (Butler I) relied heavily on In re Chmura, a
2000 Michigan Supreme Court decision that struck down Michigan’s
prohibition on judicial candidates’ false or misleading communica32
tions for overbreadth and vagueness.
The Eleventh Circuit, doubting the propriety of the district
court’s injunction against an ongoing state ethics proceeding, certified
three questions to the Alabama Supreme Court concerning the pro33
cedural protections afforded Justice See in the proceedings. In response, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed an earlier position,
cited the district court opinions and Chmura approvingly, and revised

28. Ala. Canons of Judicial Ethics Canon 7B(2) (effective Jan. 1, 1998). The Alabama Supreme Court previously had voted 8-1 to approve this Canon, with only Justice See dissenting.
Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 245 F.3d 1257, 1260 (11th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Butler
III]. Canon 7B(2) was later modified by the Alabama Supreme Court in Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission, No. 1001119, 2001 WL 812624, at *8 (Ala. May 15, 2001) [hereinafter Butler IV]. For a discussion of the modifications to Canon 7B(2), see infra note 34 and accompanying text.
29. Butler I, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 1225 (seeking a temporary restraining order); Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1243 (M.D. Ala. 2000) [hereinafter Butler
II] (seeking a preliminary injunction).
30. Butler I, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 1233. The court converted the temporary restraining order
granted in Butler I into a preliminary injunction in Butler II on the same grounds given for the
temporary restraining order. Butler II, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 1254.
31. 608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000).
32. Id. at 38.
33. Butler III, 245 F.3d at 1265–66.
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Alabama Canon 7B(2) to prohibit the dissemination of “demonstrably false information concerning a judicial candidate or an opponent
‘with “actual malice”—that is, with knowledge that it is false or with
reckless disregard of whether it is false or not.’”34 In light of these
changes, the Eleventh Circuit found that Justice See’s First Amendment claims were moot, vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction, and abstained from deciding Justice See’s other claims in
light of the ongoing JIC proceedings.35
Although the Eleventh Circuit’s final decision in the Butler litigation effectively ended the controversy over Alabama’s regulation of
false statements by judicial candidates, the fight over the constitutionality of similar restrictions in other states has just begun. The
Butler case promises to be one of the first of many constitutional
challenges in federal courts to state restrictions on misrepresentations
by judicial candidates. Recent contentious judicial elections have increased the demand for regulation of candidates’ conduct,36 and the
creation of new restrictions and increased enforcement of existing
regulations inevitably will bring more attention to the constitutional
conflict over candidates’ speech restrictions.
In this Note, I argue that restrictions on knowing misrepresentations, as set forth in Canon 5A(3)(d) of the American Bar Associa37
tion’s 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct, are both constitutional
and of vital importance. Courts have long recognized that a state has
a compelling interest in maintaining the integrity and impartiality of
its judiciary.38 The judiciary’s role and the state’s interest in the integrity and impartiality of its judiciary necessitate a different approach to
regulation of judicial elections. I demonstrate that restrictions on

34. Butler IV, No. 1001119, 2001 WL 812624, at *8 (Ala. May 15, 2001) (quoting New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964)).
35. Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm’n, 261 F.3d 1154, 1157–60 (11th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Butler V].
36. See, e.g., Glaberson, supra note 4, at A1 (noting that “[i]n more than a dozen states in
recent months, legislators, governors, courts or citizens’ groups have begun efforts to limit the
role of campaign politics in the selection of state judges”).
37. Canon 5A(3)(d) of the American Bar Association’s 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct is broader in scope than the new Canon 7B(2) that the Alabama Supreme Court created in
the Butler litigation. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 848 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring) (“There could hardly be a higher governmental interest than a State’s interest in the quality of its judiciary.”); Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991)
(“There can be no question . . . that a state has a compelling interest in the integrity of its judiciary.”).
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knowingly false and misleading statements by judicial candidates can
be tailored narrowly to achieve the state’s interest and to fit within
current First Amendment jurisprudence, including the “actual malice” defamation standard for public figures set forth by the Supreme
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan39 and its progeny.
In Part I, I discuss the history of state regulation of judicial campaign conduct. Specifically, I examine the evolution of the American
Bar Association’s Code of Judicial Conduct. Part II examines the
constitutional challenges to the 1972 and 1990 Codes’ “gag rule”—the
provisions restricting speech on “disputed legal or political issues”—
and the First Amendment arguments made for and against the gag
rule. Most challenges to the constitutionality of judicial campaign
speech restrictions have involved the gag rule. Although the gag rule
presents different issues than the knowing misrepresentation provision, certain arguments concerning the gag rule provide insight into
the relatively new misrepresentation controversy.
In Part III, I examine the constitutionality of state regulation of
judicial candidates’ misrepresentations. I focus on the New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan line of cases, which sets forth the standard to be
used when scrutinizing state restrictions on defamatory statements
about public figures. I also discuss the brief history of First Amendment attacks on state regulation of judicial candidates’ misrepresentations. Part IV attempts to determine how, in light of the gag rule’s experience, the New York Times defamation standard, and current
misrepresentation jurisprudence, a state may construct a constitutional misrepresentation provision that is broader and more effective
than the simple prohibition of knowingly or recklessly false statements put forth by the Alabama Supreme Court in the Butler litigation. Finally, I demonstrate why the 1990 Code’s misrepresentation
clause provides one example of a provision sufficiently narrow in
scope and well-defined to be constitutionally valid.
I. THE HISTORY OF RESTRICTIONS ON JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN
CONDUCT: THE ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS
After completing its Canons of Professional Ethics for Lawyers
40
in 1908, the American Bar Association (ABA) began formulating
39. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
40. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS FOR LAWYERS (1908); Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Restraint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1056, 1063
(1996).
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the first American code of judicial conduct.41 The ABA created a
Committee on Judicial Ethics, chaired by Chief Justice William Howard Taft, to address the matter.42 The Taft Committee produced the
43
Canons of Judicial Ethics, which were formally adopted at the ABA
44
annual meeting of 1924. Designed to protect parties’ rights to impartial adjudication,45 the Taft Committee’s final product consisted of
thirty-four canons, “rang[ing] from . . . specific prohibitions on judicial work, such as ex parte communications, to more general aspirational statements about avoiding the appearance of impropriety, limiting business and charitable activities, and restraining judicial
electioneering.”46 With respect to candidates for judicial office, the
new canons directed that candidates for the bench should refrain
from “campaign promises”:
[a] candidate for judicial position should not make or suffer others
to make for him, promises of conduct in office which appeal to the
cupidity or prejudices of the appointing or electing power; he should
not announce in advance his conclusions of law on disputed issues to
secure class support, and he should do nothing while a candidate to
create the impression that if chosen, he will administer his office
47
with bias, partiality or improper discrimination.
48

Reaction to the new canons was generally positive. The ABA
called the new Code of Judicial Ethics “‘the outstanding feature of
49
the meeting.’” In response to the perceived restrictive nature of the
41. See Minzner, supra note 12, at 212; Shepard, supra note 40, at 1063; Amy Craig, Comment, The Burial of an Impartial Judicial System: The Lifting of Restrictions on Judicial Candidate Speech in North Carolina, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 413, 417 (1998). Although the American Bar Association’s efforts, which eventually led to the 1924 Canon of Judicial Ethics,
discussed infra, was the first formal attempt at creating an American code of judicial conduct,
the tradition of holding judges to defined ethical standards dates back thousands of years.
Moses instructed the Israelite judges: “Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect
persons, neither take a gift; for a gift doth blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words of
the righteous.” Deuteronomy 16:19 (King James). By the seventh century, penalties for judicial
partiality began to appear in European kingdoms. Shepard, supra note 40, at 1061.
42. Shepard, supra note 40, at 1063.
43. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS (1924); Shepard, supra note 40, at 1063.
44. Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting Maintains Association’s High Standard, 10 A.B.A. J.
555, 555 (1924).
45. Minzner, supra note 12, at 212.
46. Shepard, supra note 40, at 1063–64 (citations omitted).
47. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 30 (1924).
48. Minzner, supra note 12, at 212; Shepard, supra note 40, at 1064.
49. Shepard, supra note 40, at 1063 n.17 (quoting Forty-Seventh Annual Meeting Maintains
Association’s High Standard, supra note 44).

LONG.DOC

796

01/16/02 9:21 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:787

regulations, the Columbus Dispatch noted at the time, “‘[t]here is
plenty of room off the judicial bench for anyone who regards [these]
standard[s] as too seriously restrictive of individual freedom.’”50 The
concept that judges should be held to formal standards of conduct
gained overwhelming acceptance from both the bar and the general
public, as demonstrated by the fact that, “[s]ince 1960, nearly every
state . . . creat[ed] a judicial disciplinary body . . . empowered to pursue disciplinary complaints and to recommend a variety of sanctions
to the highest court of the state.”51
The primary problems that eventually arose from the 1924 Canons were not directly caused by the restrictions on judicial conduct
but rather by the vagueness of the canons’ ethical directives. In 1972,
52
the ABA promulgated the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, consisting of seven canons, in an attempt “to shift the Canons from a list
53
of moral exhortations to a particular guide of conduct.” To make
clear that the new code went beyond simple moral aspirations, the
preface to the 1972 Code stated that the “canons and text estab54
lish[ed] mandatory standards unless otherwise indicated.” The 1972
Code addressed candidates’ communications in judicial elections in
Canon 7B(1)(c), which stated that a candidate for judicial office
“should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than
the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; or misrepresent
his identity, qualifications, present position, or other fact.”55 Between
1972 and 1990, forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the
Federal Judicial Conference adopted some form of the 1972 Code.56
The ABA again revisited the issue of judicial ethics in 1990 and
57
adopted a new Model Code of Judicial Conduct. In the preamble,
the ABA announced that the 1990 Code was designed to ensure that
“judges, individually and collectively, . . . respect and honor the judicial office as a public trust and strive to enhance and maintain confi-

50. Press Comments on Proposed Code of Judicial Ethics, 9 A.B.A. J. 191, 191 (1923)
(quoting the Columbus Dispatch).
51. Shepard, supra note 40, at 1065.
52. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
53. Minzner, supra note 12, at 213.
54. Preface to MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1972).
55. Id. Canon 7B(1)(c).
56. JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS 3 n.19 (3d ed. 2000)
(providing a complete list of states codifying all or large parts of the 1972 Code).
57. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1990).
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dence in our legal system.”58 The revisions made to the restrictions on
judicial candidates’ conduct “were substantial, and . . . heavily discussed.”59 After a number of state and federal courts found Canon
7B(1)(c) of the 1972 Code to be unconstitutionally vague and overbroad,60 the ABA worked to construct narrow, constitutionally valid
restrictions on campaign conduct by candidates for judicial office.
Canon 5A(3)(d) of the 1990 Code, replacing the old Canon 7B(1)(c),
states in relevant part:
A candidate for judicial office . . . shall not (i) make pledges or
promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and impartial
performance of the duties of the office; (ii) make statements that
commit or appear to commit the candidate with respect to cases,
controversies or issues that are likely to come before the court; or
(iii) knowingly misrepresent the identity, qualifications, present po61
sition or other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent . . . .

Canon 7B(1)(c)’s “pledges and promises” clause was left intact,
but the 1990 Code replaced the former “announce” clause with a less
62
expansive “likely to come before the court” provision. Also, no mention is made of “disputed legal or political issues” in the 1990 version.63 The 1990 Code also contained a significantly modified “misrepresentations” clause, adding a knowledge requirement and specifying
that the restriction applied to statements made regarding a candidate’s opponent as well as the candidate herself. The revised code
also replaced “should not” with “shall not” in a number of sections,
including Canon 5A(3)(d), to emphasize the mandatory nature of the
provisions.64 By 2000, twenty states had adopted all or large portions
of the 1990 Code, including two previous non-code states, Rhode Island and Wisconsin.65

58. Id. pmbl. at 3.
59. Minzner, supra note 12, at 214.
60. For a discussion of cases striking down 1972 Canon 7B(1)(c) as unconstitutional, see
infra Part II.A.
61. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d) (1990).
62. Craig, supra note 41, at 418.
63. Id.
64. Shepard, supra note 40, at 1066.
65. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 3 n.20 (providing a complete list of states codifying
all or large parts of the 1990 Code). Also, a number of additional states have adopted a combination of the two codes or modified their codes based on the 1972 Code to reflect the changes
made in the 1990 version. Id. at 4–5.
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE GAG RULE AND ITS
RELEVANCE TO THE MISREPRESENTATION CLAUSE
A. First Amendment Challenges to the Gag Rule
Challenges to the constitutionality of Canon 7B(1)(c) appeared
soon after states began adopting the 1972 Code in whole or in large
part as a means to regulate judicial candidates’ conduct. The majority
of these challenges addressed the gag rule, the restrictions on
“pledges or promises of conduct in office,” or “announce[ments] [of
the candidate’s] views on disputed legal or political issues.”66 In 1984,
the Southern District of Ohio was the scene of the first federal chal67
lenge to the gag rule in Berger v. Supreme Court. In Berger, the
plaintiff-candidate wanted to promise during the campaign to make
divorce litigants appear without an attorney and enter mediation, and
to be more personally involved in the administration and resolution
of cases.68 Believing that such statements would violate Canon
7B(1)(c), Berger sought a preliminary injunction enjoining enforce69
ment of the canon. The court denied the injunction request because
it found that Berger’s promises were not in violation of Canon
7B(1)(c) as they “relate[d] to the faithful performance of the duties of
70
judicial office.” Even though it found that Berger’s comments would
not violate the canon, the court in Berger addressed the overall constitutionality of the restrictions. After finding that Canon 7B(1)(c) is a
71
content-based restriction on speech, the Berger court applied a strict
scrutiny standard and held that the canon was necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest.72 Four years later, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s decision in Berger and upheld the constitutionality
of Canon 7B(1)(c) on the same grounds.73
The district court in Berger held that a state “has a compelling interest in assuring . . . that judicial campaigns are run in a manner so as

66. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7B(1)(c) (1972).
67. 598 F. Supp. 69 (S.D. Ohio 1984) [hereinafter Berger I].
68. Id. at 72.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 75.
71. Id. at 74–75.
72. Id. at 75.
73. Berger v. Supreme Court, 861 F.2d 719, No. 87-3935, slip op. at 2–4 (6th Cir. Oct. 31,
1988) [hereinafter Berger II]. The Court’s unpublished decision is referenced in a “Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions” appearing in the Federal Reporter.
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not to damage the actual and perceived integrity of state judges and
the bar.”74 Most courts that later examined the gag rule’s constitutionality accepted that the actual and perceived integrity and imparti75
ality of the judiciary is a compelling state interest. The question then
turned to the second part of the strict scrutiny analysis, whether the
restriction on campaign communications by judicial candidates was
narrowly tailored to protect the state’s compelling interest without
unduly impairing First Amendment rights.76
The next federal court to examine the gag rule struck down part
of Canon 7B(1)(c)’s gag rule for failing the “narrowly tailored” aspect
77
of the strict scrutiny standard. In ACLU v. Florida Bar, another preemptive strike case, a federal district court in Florida permanently
enjoined enforcement of the “disputed legal and political issues”
clause on overbreadth and vagueness grounds.78 The Florida Bar
court accepted that “states need not treat candidates for judicial office the same as candidates for other elective offices”79 and that the
state “has a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of the judi80
ciary.” The court did not accept that the canon was the least restrictive means available to protect the state’s compelling interest, however, finding that Canon 7B(1)(c)’s broad language effectively
prohibited “announcements on almost every issue that might be of interest to the public and the candidates in a judicial race.”81
The decisions concerning Canon 7B(1)(c) that followed Berger
and Florida Bar reiterated many of the arguments presented in those
two cases and followed the inconsistent pattern that the first two federal courts addressing the gag rule established. The supreme courts of
82
83
Washington and Kentucky upheld the gag rule under constitutional

74. Berger I, 598 F. Supp. at 75.
75. For an exception to this general statement, see infra note 92 and accompanying text.
But cf. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982) (noting that the states have a legitimate interest in preserving the integrity of their electoral processes).
76. See Brown, 456 U.S. at 53–54 (“When a State seeks to restrict directly the offer of ideas
by a candidate to the voters, the First Amendment surely requires that the restriction be demonstrably supported by not only a legitimate state interest, but a compelling one, and that the
restriction operate without unnecessarily circumscribing protected expression.”).
77. 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990).
78. Id. at 1099.
79. Id. at 1097.
80. Id. at 1098.
81. Id.
82. In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392 (Wash. 1988).
83. Deters v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm’n, 873 S.W.2d 200 (Ky. 1994).
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attack. In In re Kaiser, the Washington Supreme Court found that
Canon 7B(1)(c) was necessary and sufficiently limited to ensure the
protection of the state’s compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of and public confidence in the judiciary.84 The Kentucky Supreme Court in Deters v. Judicial Retirement and Removal Commission upheld the 1990 Code’s version of the gag rule after having
85
earlier struck down the 1972 Code’s version. The court in Deters relied on Ackerson v. Kentucky Judicial Retirement & Removal Commission,86 in which a federal district court found Kentucky’s canon,
based on the 1990 Code’s gag rule, sufficiently narrow to avoid any
unconstitutional abridgement of First Amendment rights.87
88
In Beshear v. Butt, another federal district court struck down all
89
of Canon 7B(1)(c) on overbreadth and vagueness grounds. In this
“rare case in which a constitutional challenge arose as a defense to ac90
tual disciplinary proceedings,” a candidate for municipal court judge
faced sanctions for stating during the election that his court would not
accept plea bargaining.91 The court struck down Canon 7B(1)(c) after
finding that the state presented no compelling interest and failed to
demonstrate “some imminent dangers or wrong growing out of Judge
Beshear’s expressions.”92

84. Kaiser, 759 P.2d at 399.
85. Deters, 873 S.W.2d at 204–05; see also J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 954–57 (Ky.
1991) (holding that the 1972 Code’s gag rule violated the First Amendment).
86. 776 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Ky. 1991).
87. Id. at 315. The Ackerson court enjoined enforcement of the canon as it applied to
comments about administrative issues surrounding the court but upheld the restrictions on adjudicatory matters. Id. at 315–16.
88. 773 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Ark. 1991), rev’d without op., 966 F.2d 1458 (8th Cir. 1992).
89. Id. at 1234.
90. Mark R. Riccardi, Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7B(1)(c): An Unconstitutional Restriction on Freedom of Speech, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 153, 173 (1993).
91. Beshear, 773 F. Supp. at 1233.
92. Id. at 1234. One observer noted that the Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability
Commission refused to hear Beshear’s constitutional argument against the canon, which may
have led to the court’s “unusually strict review.” See Riccardi, supra note 90, at 174 (“Where a
state agency refuses to entertain constitutional defenses when the First Amendment is implicated, it strongly suggests that the statute is too broadly worded and, depending on the exact
nature of the contested speech, too broadly applied as well.”). The court’s use of a hybrid “imminent danger or wrong” test instead of standard strict scrutiny has led a few commentators to
criticize the Beshear decision. See, e.g., Daniel J. Burke, Code of Judicial Conduct Canon
7B(1)(c): Toward the Proper Regulation of Judicial Speech, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 181, 193
(1993) (arguing that the Beshear decision is fatally flawed because the court “referr[ed] to the
wrong clause in the canon and employ[ed] the wrong constitutional test”).
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Not surprisingly, the federal circuit courts of appeals are currently in conflict over the constitutionality of the 1972 Code’s gag
rule. As noted earlier, the Sixth Circuit upheld the 1972 version of the
93
94
gag rule in the Berger litigation. In Stretton v. Disciplinary Board,
the Third Circuit overturned a district court decision striking down
Canon 7B(1)(c), requiring that the state supreme court construe the
95
Canon narrowly, assuring its constitutionality. The court applied the
two-part strict scrutiny standard and found that the state had a compelling interest in protecting the integrity of its judiciary and that,
when narrowly construed by the state supreme court, the gag rule was
the least restrictive means available.96 Defending its reluctance to
overturn Canon 7B(1)(c) and assuming that the state supreme court
would construe the restriction narrowly, the Third Circuit in Stretton
relied on the rule the Supreme Court gave in Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council97
concerning statutory construction in the face of constitutional challenge.98 DeBartolo Corp. stated that “‘every reasonable construction
must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutional99
ity.’”
Two years after Stretton, the Seventh Circuit struck down all of
Canon 7B(1)(c) as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague in Buckley
100
v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board. Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in Buckley, found the prohibition on any announcement
of views on “disputed legal or political issues” unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad because virtually anything could be a disputed
political issue.101 Posner recognized the inherent conflict between the
First Amendment rights of candidates for public office and the state’s
interest in having judges decide cases according to law rather than
campaign promises. Because of the breadth and vagueness of the
statute, Posner found that silence presented “the only safe response”

93. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
94. 944 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1991).
95. Id. at 138.
96. Id. at 142–44.
97. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
98. Stretton, 944 F.2d at 144.
99. Id. (quoting DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575).
100. 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993).
101. Id. The 1990 Codes addressed and rectified this problem by eliminating the words “political or legal” from the Canon and adding the phrase “likely to come before the court.” See
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii) (1990).
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for a candidate.102 Posner used economic analysis to describe the need
for an unfettered “marketplace of ideas” existing before an election:
[I]nterference with the marketplace of ideas and opinions is at its
zenith when the “customers” are most avid for the market’s “product.” The only time the public takes much interest in the ideas and
opinions of judges or judicial candidates is when an important judicial office has to be filled; and in Illinois those offices are filled by
election. It is basically only during the campaign that judicial aspirants have an audience, and literal compliance with [the Rule] would
103
deprive the audience of the show.

Starting with Berger and Florida Bar, state and federal courts that
have examined the 1972 Code’s gag rule remain in conflict over the
provision’s constitutionality.
B. Arguments Regarding the Gag Rule and the First Amendment and
Their Applicability to the Misrepresentation Clause
The constitutionality of restrictions on judicial candidates’ right
to pledge or promise conduct in office or to discuss disputed legal or
political issues remains contested. At the root of the controversy
stand three long-recognized interests: a state’s interest in the integrity
and impartiality of its judiciary, a candidate’s right to free speech, and
the voter’s interest in access to relevant information concerning candidates. Much jurisprudence and debate in the last twenty years focused on how courts and lawmakers can balance these three interests
104
to satisfy both the concerned parties and the Constitution.
Some arguments about the gag rule in both case law and the academic literature are directly applicable when examining the constitutionality of restrictions on knowing misrepresentation by judicial can105
didates. These arguments demonstrate that, in an analysis of the
102. Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228.
103. Id. at 228–29.
104. See, e.g., id. at 227:
[O]nly a fanatic would suppose that one of the principles should give way completely
to the other—that the principle of freedom of speech should be held to entitle a candidate for judicial office to promise to vote for one side or another in a particular case
or class of cases or that the principle of impartial legal justice should be held to prevent a candidate for such office from furnishing any information or opinion to the
electorate beyond his name, rank, and serial number.
105. Because the gag rule and misrepresentation clause restrict different types of speech, not
all arguments concerning the gag rule are relevant when discussing restrictions on knowing misrepresentations. One interesting rationale presented to support restrictions on speech by judicial
candidates is that, under the separation of powers doctrine, “political issues are not justici-
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constitutionality of the misrepresentation clause, the state’s interest in
the integrity of the judiciary remains constant. The voter’s interest in
information, however, shifts to support restrictions on false or misleading statements so long as the restrictions are narrowly tailored
and clearly defined, thus defined to avoid a “chilling” effect on candidates’ communication of accurate information to voters.
In advocating the gag rule’s constitutionality, a number of scholars argue that the Code is necessary to protect future unknown litigants, as well as the interests of candidates, voters, and the state. Arguing that the canons are ineffective at prohibiting discussion of
potential issues before the court, Max Minzner criticizes most courts
that have examined the constitutionality of the gag rule for “fail[ing]
to recognize that the goal of the Canon is to protect the right to a fair
trial.”106 Randall Shepard believes that restraints on campaign speech
by judicial candidates are actually due process protections for future
litigants that will appear before elected judges, giving a constitutional
source to the state’s (and future litigant’s) interest in preserving the
107
impartiality of the judiciary.
However, with both the gag rule and misrepresentation clause,
the state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity and impartiality
of, and public confidence in, its judiciary. Judicial impartiality is not
directly jeopardized by candidates making false or misleading statements. But the integrity of the judiciary and the citizenry’s perception
of and faith in the judicial branch are even greater concerns with respect to judicial candidates’ dishonest statements. As judicial elections evolve to resemble elections for political offices, complete with
enormous war chests and mudslinging, the threat to judicial integrity
and public confidence in the judiciary posed by knowingly false
statements or misrepresentations by judicial candidates becomes increasingly real. A state’s interest in protecting the integrity of its judi-

able . . . . [m]aking promises or airing predispositions on issues or cases likely to come before a
court is, in effect, unofficial and prohibited policy making.” Brunner, supra note 25, at 733–34.
Obviously, because false or misleading statements do not constitute policymaking, this argument would not apply to a misrepresentation provision.
106. Minzner, supra note 12, at 228; see also Burke, supra note 92, at 183 (“Canon 7B(1)(c)
is a necessary restriction fundamental for the continued protection of the right to a fair trial.”).
107. Shepard, supra note 40, at 1060. Shepard, chief justice of the Indiana Supreme Court,
discusses the conflict between a candidate’s interest in free speech and the litigant’s interest in
due process, believing that, because both interests are weighty, the choice is a policy decision
that should be, and has been, made by the state legislatures. Id. (“[L]egislative and rule-making
institutions have already made a legitimate choice that should be honored by judges.”).
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ciary is equally strong with respect to the gag rule and misrepresentation clause.
The courts that struck down the constitutionality of various versions of the gag rule all stressed both the importance of a candidate’s
free speech rights and the voter’s interest in information about candidates. Those two interests work much differently in the context of restrictions on false and misleading communications. As described by
Judge Posner in Buckley, the voter needs a complete and uninhibited
“marketplace of ideas” to make an informed decision when voting,
especially in the context of judicial office, which rarely receives much
attention outside of elections.108 False and misleading statements that
a candidate knowingly makes only clutter and distort this marketplace of ideas, making it harder for a voter to make the informed decision that the free marketplace should promote.
Continuing with the “marketplace of ideas” concept, a restriction
on misrepresentation might inhibit the flow of valuable ideas and information before an election if the prohibition is overly broad or unclear. A chilling of candidates’ speech would leave the voter with less
information about those candidates who were uncertain about what,
if anything, they could say during a campaign. This is the problem
Posner identified as the source of the gag rule’s unconstitutionality in
109
Buckley. The problem of overbreadth or vagueness must be avoided
if misrepresentation restrictions are to be constitutionally valid. The
Supreme Court has stated that the First Amendment does not protect
false statements.110 Therefore, the only interests a candidate would
have in a misrepresentation provision is that it be narrowly tailored
and well defined to prevent any chilling of protected speech. So long
as a misrepresentation clause clears the narrow construction hurdle,
protecting against overbreadth and vagueness, its constitutionality
should be assured.

108. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text.
110. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990).
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE RESTRICTIONS ON
MISREPRESENTATIONS BY JUDICIAL CANDIDATES
A. State Regulation of Defamation Concerning Public Figures
The preceding analysis of the arguments about the gag rule’s
constitutionality provides valuable insight into the constitutionality of
misrepresentation restrictions but does not end the issue. The Supreme Court, in a line of cases starting with New York Times Co. v.
111
Sullivan, has defined the extent to which a state may regulate statements made about public figures with respect to their official conduct
in light of the First Amendment. Although these cases specifically involve civil defamation claims made by aggrieved public figures, the
standards the Court announced also would apply to penalties enforced directly by the state with respect to statements of a libelous or
slanderous nature.112 The creation of a civil claim for defamation and
restrictions on judicial candidates’ false or misleading statements have
the same effect on the speaker, forbidding the articulation of false
statements. Also, the language used in the decisions, discussing “free
debate” and the appropriateness of criticism of public officials, helps
expand the applicability of this line of cases to speech restrictions on
judicial candidates. Any restriction on false or misleading statements
by judicial candidates must conform to the standards set by the Court
in the New York Times line of cases.
In New York Times, a county commissioner for the city of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a civil libel action against the New York
Times Company based on an advertisement that the paper carried de113
scribing the status of civil rights in Montgomery. The Court devised
an “actual malice” test to determine when a defamation claim based
on criticism of a public official infringes upon the speaker’s First
Amendment rights or unduly chills protected speech.114 The decision
“prohibit[ed] a public official from recovering damages for a defama111. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
112. The Alabama Supreme Court recognized the applicability of the New York Times line
of cases when they incorporated the decision’s “actual malice” standard into their revised
Canon 7B(2) after Justice See’s successful challenge to the canon’s constitutionality. See supra
note 34 and accompanying text. In Part IV, I will argue that Canon 5A(3)(D)(iii) of the 1990
Model Code, a broader and more effective restriction on misrepresentations by judicial candidates than the rule put forth by the Alabama Supreme Court, is constitutional under the New
York Times line of cases.
113. 376 U.S. at 256.
114. Id. at 279–80.
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tory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false.”115
The New York Times Court justified the high standard for defamation
claims against public officials by pointing to the importance of open
exchange, which is guaranteed by the First Amendment. Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, believed that an “erroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if the
freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they
‘need . . . to survive.’”116 In his concurrence, Justice Goldberg expressed his strong belief “that the Constitution accords citizens . . . an
unconditional freedom to criticize official conduct.”117
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,118 decided three years after New
York Times, the Court considered whether the New York Times actual malice standard applied to defamation claims made by public fig119
ures who do not hold official public office. In Butts, the Saturday
Evening Post accused Butts of “conspiring to ‘fix’ a football game between the University of Georgia and the University of Alabama,”
causing Butts to initiate a libel claim against the Post’s publishers.120
At the time of the suit, Butts was the athletic director at the University of Georgia and its former football coach. Although Georgia is a
state university, Butts technically was employed by the Georgia Athletic Association, a private corporation, raising the question of
whether a privately employed individual could be a “public official”
under New York Times.121
The Butts Court settled the issue by expanding the coverage of
the New York Times actual malice defamation standard to include
122
“public figures” in addition to public officials. In his concurring
opinion, Chief Justice Warren defined “public figures” as nonpublic
persons who “are nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of
important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events
123
in areas of concern to society at large.” Under the broad definition
115. Id.
116. Id. at 271–72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
117. Id. at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
118. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
119. Id. at 134.
120. Id. at 135.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 154–55.
123. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
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given by Chief Justice Warren in Butts, candidates for judicial office
certainly would fall within the category of public figures when one
considers their “involve[ment] in the resolution of important public
questions.”124 Therefore, under Butts, the New York Times actual
malice standard is relevant to any restriction on misrepresentations
that affect judicial candidates, whether challengers or incumbent
judges.
125
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
126
Co., the Supreme Court further clarified the scope of the actual
malice test. In Gertz, the Court held that the standard introduced in
New York Times applies only to public persons, stating that private
individuals seeking redress for defamation need not show actual malice.127 The Court based this distinction on two grounds. First, “public
officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them.
No such assumption is justified with respect to a private individual.”128
Second, public persons “usually enjoy significantly greater access to
the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements.”129 In Milkovich, the
Court emphasized that First Amendment protections do not adhere
130
to statements that imply facts falsely. The Court examined the distinctions between fact and opinion and held that “opinions” can be
actionable consistent with the First Amendment “where a statement
of ‘opinion’ on a matter of public concern reasonably implies false
and defamatory facts regarding public figures or officials.”131
B. Constitutionality of the Misrepresentation Clause
The vast majority of cases examining the constitutionality of state
restrictions on judicial candidates’ speech have concerned the gag
rule. Yet, courts at both the state and local levels have tested a number of versions of the misrepresentation clause. An examination of
these few cases, combined with the arguments presented concerning

124. Id.
125. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
126. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
127. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 343.
128. Id. at 345.
129. Id. at 344.
130. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19.
131. Id. at 20.
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the gag rule’s constitutionality and the New York Times line of cases,
demonstrates how a state may restrict misrepresentations made by
judicial candidates in hopes of maintaining the integrity of, and public
confidence in, its judiciary.
In 1975, the Kansas Supreme Court was asked to determine the
constitutionality of the recently created misrepresentation clause in
Canon 7B(1)(c) of the 1972 Code. In In re Baker,132 the Kansas Supreme Court upheld sanctions leveled against a candidate under the
misrepresentation clause for distributing literature that incorrectly
stated that his opponent, the incumbent, could collect a monthly pension if he lost the election.133 Although the 1972 Code, unlike the 1990
Code, does not provide an explicit restriction on misrepresentations
about a candidate’s opponent, the court found that the phrase “other
fact” brought a candidate’s opponent within the language of the
134
canon. The Baker court never discussed a First Amendment problem with the misrepresentation clause, noting that “[s]o long as we
continue to have partisan elections for judicial office we think a challenger must be free to criticize an incumbent’s record, so long as the
criticism is accurate.”135
In 1978, the Washington Supreme Court more closely examined
the interplay of the 1972 Code’s misrepresentation clause and the
136
First Amendment in In re Donohoe. Again, the 1972 misrepresentation clause withstood constitutional attack. The court rejected a reprimanded attorney’s free speech claims and upheld disciplinary action
for his engaging in “an intentional and deliberate pattern of making
137
false statements of fact.” The court found that Canon 7B(1)(a),
which states that a candidate for judicial office should maintain the
dignity appropriate to judicial office, is not violated by a candidate’s
138
criticism of an opponent so long as the criticism is fair and factual.
Echoing the language used in Baker, the court held that “[a] candi132. 542 P.2d 701 (Kan. 1975).
133. Id. at 706. The pension under Kansas statute would be available to the incumbent judge
only if he were “permanently” disabled, which he was not. Id.
134. See id. at 706 (“Judge Baker and his supporters did ‘misrepresent’ a ‘fact’ in violation of
Canon 7B(1)(c).”).
135. Id. The Baker court actually overturned five of the six sanctions based on alleged violations of the gag rule but upheld the sanction for misrepresentation without a discussion of the
clause’s constitutionality. Id. at 703–07.
136. 580 P.2d 1093 (Wash. 1978).
137. Id. at 1097.
138. Id. The same “dignity” language appears in the 1990 Code. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(a) (1990).
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date for judicial office has a right to challenge an incumbent judge’s
ability, decisions and judicial conduct, but it must be done fairly, accurately and upon facts, not false representations.”139 With respect to
free speech protections, the Donohoe court stated:
[W]e do not believe that the First Amendment protects one who utters a statement with knowledge of its falsity, even in the context of
a judicial campaign. Such speech is not beneficial to the public and is
generally harmful to the person against whom it is directed. The
only beneficiary of the comment is the utterer thereof. On balance,
140
such statements are not deserving of constitutional protection.

After finding that Donohoe deliberately made false statements of
fact, the court expressly noted that, because it determined that the
statements at issue were false, it did not need to determine whether
merely misleading statements are protected under the First Amend141
ment.
In an unpublished 1997 decision, the Sixth Circuit upheld two
provisions of the Ohio Code of Judicial Conduct similar to misrepre142
sentation restrictions. In Harper v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
Sara P. Harper, a sitting Ohio Court of Appeals judge, ran against an
incumbent for a seat on the Ohio Supreme Court.143 During the campaign, Harper ran radio advertisements claiming the incumbent, Justice Alice Robie Resnick, was beholden to plaintiffs’ lawyers who

139. Donohoe, 580 P.2d at 1097.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1098. Candidates in a variety of states have been warned or disciplined for violating the misrepresentation clause. A judicial candidate in Michigan was “instructed that he
could not use the slogan ‘A Judge for a Change’ because it falsely suggested that he was an incumbent judge.” Alfini & Brooks, supra note 9, at 693–94 (citing State Bar of Mich. Comm. on
Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Informal Op. CI-556 (1980)). A judge in Kentucky “was suspended
without salary for ten days for a violation of Canon 7B(1)(c) after publishing campaign advertising that indicated a professional poll placed him ahead of his opponent when in fact no such
poll had been conducted.” Id. at 694 (citing In re Jack D. Wood, Unreported Order (Ky.
Comm’n 1982)). Another judicial candidate in Kentucky was sanctioned for distributing campaign materials that falsely claimed that he was the incumbent. Id. at 693 (citing Order of Private Reprimand, 7 Accent on Courts, No. 1, at 23 (Ky. Comm’n 1985)). A judge in Washington
state was publicly reprimanded “for a violation of Canon 7B(1)(c) after issuing a campaign
pamphlet, deceptively similar to the official voter’s pamphlet, that failed to reveal that he had
opposition and that the position sought was contested.” Id. at 694 (citing In re McGlothen, Unreported Letter of Admonishment (Wash. Judicial Qual. Comm’n 1983)).
142. 113 F.3d 1234, No. 96-3186, 1997 WL 225899 (6th Cir. May 2, 1997) (unreported decision).
143. Id. at *1.
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gave more than $300,000 to her campaign.144 The Ohio Supreme
Court’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel submitted a formal complaint
against Harper, charging Harper with violation of Ohio’s “Canon 2A,
for failing to conduct herself so as to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary . . . and Canon 7B(1)(a), for
failing to maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office.”145
Harper filed suit in federal court to enjoin disciplinary proceedings
against her.146 Harper claimed that the two provisions of the Ohio
Code violated her First Amendment right of free speech because of
their unconstitutional overbreadth and vagueness, arguing that “these
canons ‘generally require that a judge must conduct herself in a manner that makes the judiciary look good’ and prohibit not only false
statements but also truthful statements that portray Ohio’s judiciary
in a negative light.”147
The Sixth Circuit dismissed Harper’s overbreadth and vagueness
claims. Citing Stretton, the court held that “overbreadth may be
avoided if the rule . . . in question is reasonably susceptible of a narrow construction or has, in fact, been narrowly interpreted by the
agency responsible for its enforcement.”148 Echoing both Baker and
Donohoe, the court found that “the [Ohio] supreme court has long
held that a candidate for judicial office may criticize the judgments
and conduct of the incumbent during an election campaign, but has
emphasized that the criticism must be made in a fair and truthful
manner.”149 With respect to the vagueness claim, which challenged the
language “maintain the dignity” of judicial office and “promote public confidence” in the judiciary, the court cited the Supreme Court’s
150
decision in Parker v. Levy, in which the Court upheld the military’s
prohibition on conduct “unbecoming an officer and a gentleman.”151
As in Parker, the court found that the disciplinary board had pro152
vided guidance for what “is and is not appropriate under the Code.”
According to the Sixth Circuit, Ohio sufficiently established that it

144. Id.
145. Id. Harper was charged with violating three other provisions of the Ohio Code, but the
Sixth Circuit’s opinion addresses only the two provisions listed. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *2.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *3.
150. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
151. Harper, 1997 WL 225899, at *5 (quoting Parker, 417 U.S. at 757).
152. Id.
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allows criticism of an incumbent judge or justice so long as “the criticism is truthful and accurate,” which the court found sufficient to defeat a vagueness claim.153
Despite the extremely deferential approach the Sixth Circuit
took in Harper with respect to state regulation of misrepresentations
by judicial candidates, a federal district court in 2000 found a more
narrowly worded provision unconstitutionally vague and overbroad in
154
Butler v. Alabama Judicial Inquiry Commission (Butler I). In Butler,
the canon in question contained prohibitions on both the knowing or
reckless dissemination of false information about the candidate or an
opponent and the dissemination of true information that is deceptive
155
or misleading to a reasonable person. Using a strict scrutiny standard for a content-based restriction on speech, the court in Butler
held that, although the state has a compelling interest in maintaining
the integrity of its judiciary, Canon 7B(2) was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to satisfy the First Amendment.156
IV. CANON 5A(3)(D)(III) OF THE 1990 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT: A CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTION ON KNOWING
MISREPRESENTATIONS BY JUDICIAL CANDIDATES
After Butler, one might wonder whether judicial attempts to determine the constitutionality of the misrepresentation provisions of
the 1972 and 1990 Codes will become as inconsistent and unclear as
the constitutional validity of the gag rule. Under Berger II and
Harper, it is clear that the Sixth Circuit, deferring to the state’s interest in preserving judicial integrity, would uphold the more precise and
narrow language used in the 1972 and 1990 Codes that prohibits misrepresentations by judicial candidates. The Third Circuit also would
likely find the misrepresentation clause valid, considering the emphasis it placed on the narrow application, as opposed to construction, of

153. Id.
154. 111 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1235 (M.D. Ala. 2000). For a discussion of the facts underlying
the Butler decision, see supra notes 26–35 and accompanying text.
155. Ala. Canons of Judicial Ethics Canon 7B(2) (effective Jan. 1, 1998). As noted, the Alabama Supreme Court modified the requirements of Canon 7B(2) in Butler IV, No. 1001119,
2001 WL 812624, at *8 (Ala. May 15, 2001). See supra notes 28, 34 and accompanying text.
156. Butler I, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 1233. After the Alabama Supreme Court acknowledged that
Canon 7B(2) violated the First Amendment, and the court changed the canon’s language to
prohibit only the knowing or reckless dissemination of false information by judicial candidates,
the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s decision on mootness grounds. Butler V, 261
F.3d 1154, 1157–60 (11th Cir. 2001).
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the gag rule in Stretton v. Disciplinary Board. The Seventh Circuit’s
concern with the gag rule’s overbreadth and vagueness and its resulting chilling of protected speech, however, was exactly the same concern the federal district court in Butler and the Michigan Supreme
Court in In re Chmura157 expressed with the versions of the misrepresentation clause they struck down. The task becomes, then, to find a
way to structure a restriction on candidate misrepresentations that
would be constitutionally acceptable, enforceable, and effective. The
1990 Code’s misrepresentation clause presents one model that should
survive First Amendment challenges.
For the statute in question to survive a First Amendment strict
scrutiny analysis, the state must show, first, that the “regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest,” and that the regula158
tion “is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” Virtually all courts
agree that the preservation of judicial integrity is a compelling state
interest.159 A state’s attempt to prevent judicial candidates from making false or misleading statements during a campaign clearly represents an attempt to preserve the integrity of and public confidence in
its judicial system.160 With the first part of a strict scrutiny analysis addressed, the question remains whether a misrepresentation provision
can be narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary infringement upon First
Amendment rights.
Reflecting concerns with the gag rule, the courts that have struck
down various versions of the misrepresentation clause have done so
on overbreadth and vagueness grounds, finding that the clauses were
not narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s compelling interest, and
that they also unduly restricted protected speech. The 1990 Code
solves the overbreadth problems that plagued earlier versions of the
misrepresentation provisions. Because it applies only to knowing misrepresentations, the 1990 Code’s misrepresentation clause contains an
intent element that protects a speaker’s benign, but erroneous, misrepresentations during a campaign. The court in Butler approvingly
cited the Harper decision from the Sixth Circuit but held that Alabama’s version of the misrepresentation clause was unconstitutionally

157. 608 N.W.2d 31 (Mich. 2000).
158. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
159. Even the courts in Butler and Chmura, when striking down misrepresentation provisions, found the state’s interest in the integrity of the judiciary to be compelling and satisfactory
for strict scrutiny analysis. Butler I, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 1233; Chmura, 608 N.W.2d at 40.
160. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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overbroad because it lacked the “knowing” requirement that Ohio’s
misrepresentation clause contained in Harper.161 The Butler I court
even stated that it could “conceive of no way, without rewriting the
canon, to limit the construction and narrow the canon’s proscriptions.”162 Had Alabama’s canon at issue in Butler I and Butler II contained the language of Ohio’s code or the 1990 Model Code, the court
almost certainly would have reached a different conclusion.
A prohibition only on knowing misrepresentations also presents
fewer vagueness concerns than earlier versions of the clause. The two
elements of a violation are clearly defined and can be shown with
some degree of certainty. A state can go even further than the 1990
Model Code by providing a list of acceptable and unacceptable actions in the actual canon. The Sixth Circuit in Harper upheld the constitutionality of a loosely worded restriction on judicial candidates’
speech because it believed that the state supreme court had suffi163
ciently defined the meaning of the Canon’s vague language. A state
could use examples to define precisely the type of the conduct that
constitutes “knowing misrepresentations” to better instruct judicial
candidates and avoid vagueness concerns.164
The “knowing misrepresentation” language used in Canon
5A(3)(d)(iii) of the 1990 Code conforms to the actual malice standard
developed by the Court in the New York Times line of cases. Under
the actual malice standard, a state cannot allow recovery of damages
by a public official for defamation relating to his official conduct unless the speaker acted with knowledge that the statement was false or
165
with reckless disregard of the statement’s accuracy. The 1990 Code
prohibits knowingly false statements and therefore fits safely within
the knowledge requirement of the actual malice standard. The Alabama Supreme Court in the Butler litigation went so far as to equate
the actual malice standard with the state’s revised misrepresentation
clause, which bans only recklessly and knowingly false statements

161. Butler I, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 1236–38.
162. Id. at 1238.
163. Harper v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 113 F.3d 1234, No. 96-3186, 1997 WL 225899,
at *2–*6 (6th Cir. May 2, 1997). For a discussion of the Harper decision, see supra notes 142–53
and accompanying text.
164. For example, a state could require explicitly in its code that in print, radio, or television
advertisements, distortions of an opponent’s judicial record fall within the purview of the regulations.
165. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
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made by judicial candidates.166 Of course, by prohibiting only knowingly false statements, the Alabama Supreme Court left unregulated
knowingly misleading statements, leaving the efficacy of their new restrictions in doubt.
The question remains whether knowingly misleading statements,
which most courts have found fall within the scope of a restriction on
misrepresentation, satisfy an actual malice analysis in the context of
judicial elections. Although the Alabama Supreme Court in the Butler litigation did not prohibit knowingly misleading statements in
Alabama’s revised Canon 7B(2), prohibitions on knowingly misleading statements likely satisfy the New York Times standard for three
167
reasons. First, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Court examined a state defamation law and held that First Amendment protections do not adhere to statements that imply false facts.168 The Court
found that even statements made in the form of an opinion about the
official work of public figures could be actionable for defamation if
the opinion implies a false factual basis.169 In the context of knowing
misrepresentations, a candidate-speaker is stating a fact, such as
“Judge Doe let a convicted rapist walk free.” Although this statement
may be technically true, suppose that the actual cause of the rapist’s
release was a procedural error by a prosecutor, leaving the judge no
choice but to release the rapist. In this situation, the statement
knowingly and deceptively implies untrue facts, such as “Judge Doe
does not think it is very important to imprison convicted rapists.”
Misrepresentations of this sort contain the implied, false factual foundation that the Milkovich Court found unprotected by the First
Amendment. Because these statements lack First Amendment protections, the knowingly misleading category of restrictions is constitutional if narrowly tailored to avoid the infringement of legitimate
First Amendment rights. As noted above, the knowledge requirement
and use of examples of prohibited conduct would protect the regulations from overbreadth and vagueness challenges.170
Also, a rationale given for the public figure/private individual
171
distinction in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. suggests that state regula166. Butler IV, No. 1001119, 2001 WL 812624, at *8 (Ala. May 15, 2001) (quoting New York
Times, 376 U.S. at 280).
167. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
168. Id. at 18–19.
169. Id. at 20–21.
170. See supra notes 161–64 and accompanying text.
171. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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tion of judicial candidates’ knowingly misleading, though not technically false, statements is constitutional. In Gertz, the Court noted that
public figures “usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements.”172 Judicial candidates, however, are more restricted in their ability to counteract false statements
than typical public figures because their conduct is governed by
Canon 5A(3)(d) of the 1990 Code, including the gag rule.173 As one
state supreme court justice observed, “the target of false accusations
in a race for the bench cannot fully respond to them . . . . [because
most states have] rules that bar judicial candidates from discussing
how they would vote on issues that might come before them.”174 If
Candidate A, running for a state supreme court seat, asserts, “If
elected, Candidate B will invalidate all state gun control laws after
finding they violate the Second Amendment,” Candidate B may not
be able to respond without violating the gag rule and taking a position
on an issue “likely to come before the court.” Judicial candidates
cannot always use “channels of effective communication” to rebut
misleading statements made about them and should not be left in the
vulnerable position of fighting a political battle with one hand tied
behind their backs.
Finally, the separate possibility exists that should it reject the
first two arguments, the Court could carve out a small exception to
the New York Times actual malice requirement for knowingly misleading statements, given the respect courts consistently and deservingly have paid to a state’s interest in the protection of its judicial system’s integrity. The New York Times standard represents a balance
between the First Amendment protections for individuals and a
state’s interest in protecting public figures from defamatory statements. If the fact that the public figures in question are judicial candidates is thrown into the equation, it is entirely plausible that the
courts, which always have recognized the preservation of judicial integrity as a compelling interest, would be willing to tilt the balance a
bit in the state’s favor. This additional weight thrown on the balance
of interests may be enough to justify a narrow exception to New York
172. Id. at 344.
173. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(e) (1990) (“A candidate for judicial office . . . may respond to personal attacks or attacks on the candidate’s record as long as the
response does not violate Section 5A(3)(d).”).
174. Glaberson, supra note 1, at A1 (paraphrasing Justice Leah J. Sears of the Georgia Supreme Court).
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Times. The Third Circuit, as demonstrated by Stretton,175 and the Sixth
Circuit, as shown by Harper,176 are two courts likely to accept such an
exception if the states narrowly apply the restriction. This exception
would be more universally recognized if the restriction on knowingly
misleading statements is clearly defined and clarified with a list of examples of acceptable and unacceptable behavior.177 Examples add to a
restriction’s clarity and provide protection against constitutional attack on vagueness or chilling grounds.
CONCLUSION
With judicial campaigns receiving more funding and more attention, states that elect judges must ensure that judicial elections do not
become indistinguishable from elections for other political offices.
Judges play a unique role in government as impartial and unbiased
arbiters of justice. Deceptive or false statements made by candidates
during elections only cloud the public’s knowledge of the candidates
and weaken the perception of the judiciary as an institution of integrity and justice. Canon 5A(3)(d)(iii) of the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct provides one model that states can constitutionally follow to preserve judicial integrity without abridging the free speech
rights of candidates or limiting the flow of accurate information to
voters. By requiring knowledge of a statement’s inaccuracy, the provision excludes well-meaning but simply erroneous statements and
guarantees that protected speech will not be chilled. Canon
5A(3)(d)(iii) is a modest restriction, limited in scope, and many observers may argue that more needs to be done to protect the judiciary
from those who seek to join it. Nevertheless, Canon 5A(3)(d)(iii) is
sufficiently narrow to survive First Amendment attacks and represents a positive first step in defending the actual and perceived integrity of the judiciary.

175.
176.
177.

See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 142–53 and accompanying text.
See supra note 164 and accompanying text.

